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28 AUG 1980

Executive Registry

80-703113

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Acting Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: 25X1A [redacted]
Chief, East Asia Division

25X6

SUBJECT: [redacted]

1. In view of the political sensitivity of this issue it is suggested you brief Dr. Brzezinski orally on it.

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No Need for Welfare

Jeff Carter's rising career

Brother Billy is not the only international businessman in the Carter family. TIME has learned that the President's youngest son Jeff, 27, has worked since 1978 as a computer consultant and that his clients, at least one of whom has agreed to pay a six-figure fee, included the World Bank and the authoritarian government of the Philippines.

The shiest of the President's four children, Donnel Jeffrey Carter got involved in his little-known career while a student at George Washington University, where he graduated with honors in 1978 with a bachelor's degree in geography, specializing in computer cartography. The technique plots data, like the location of a city's low-income families, on maps as an aid to social workers and urban planners.

At George Washington, Jeff Carter became friendly with a computer instructor, Robert Mercready, now 55, who had just been hired by the university. Mercready had spent 16 years as a desk-bound intelligence analyst for the Defense Intelligence Agency. Mercready and Carter formed Computer Mapping Consultants, Inc. The business move was viewed as quite inappropriate by some of Mercready's colleagues at George Washington and he left the university.

By then, Mercready and Carter were working as consultants for the World Bank. In February 1978 the bank sent Mercready to Yugoslavia to advise the government on a highway planning project. In November the bank sent Mercready to Seoul to determine the best locations for twelve new wholesale marketplaces in the city. The World Bank paid the two-man company at a daily rate of \$180 for Mercready and \$150 for Carter, sums in line with normal consultant fees. The total payments were \$6,600 in fiscal 1978, \$19,766 in 1979 and \$24,000 in 1980.

Then, in March of this year, things began looking up for Mercready and Carter. At Mercready's suggestion, the World Bank sent the partners (accompanied by Jeff's wife Annette) to Manila to make a study of solid-waste disposal in the city. The project, for which they were paid \$10,000, was part of an ambitious slum rebuilding program that is the special cause of Imelda Marcos, wife of Strongman President Ferdinand Marcos.

President Carter approved his son's trip, according to Secret Service records. He also told the State Department that Jeff and Annette were to be considered ordinary citizens—they were not to be briefed in advance or given red-carpet treatment by the U.S. embassy in Manila. Nonetheless, the visit was hardly routine. Mercready, Jeff and Annette Carter were met at the airport by Marcos' younger daughter Irene. They paid a cour-

tesy call on Imelda Marcos. Jeff and Annette also were guests at Imelda's 40th birthday party at the Malacañan Palace. The Philippine government tried to use the visit as a means of improving its image. The pro-Marcos *Daily Express* quoted Jeff as saying: "Of course my father does not believe what is being written about the Philippines, but I think it would be best that they [his father and mother] come here and see your beautiful country." The White House had no comment to make on the quote.

Soon after the two businessmen returned to Washington, Mercready said, the Philippines offered to hire them to set up a computer mapping system for the entire country. About six weeks ago, according to World Bank officers, Mercready and Carter announced that they had obtained a two-year contract with the Philippines that will pay them \$210,000.



The Carters' newest entrepreneur
Friends at the top in the Philippines.

The contract was signed by Imelda Marcos.

Justice Department lawyers believe that there is no need for Jeff Carter and Robert Mercready to register as foreign agents, as Billy Carter was forced to do, because they are involved only in commercial activities with overseas governments. White House officials insisted that there is nothing improper about Jeff Carter's business dealings. Said a White House spokesman: "Entering into a contract with a foreign government is no different from signing one with an American corporation. Members of the President's family have to make a living. Otherwise, we would have to create a welfare program for them."

At week's end Mercready headed for Manila; Jeff Carter stayed behind temporarily—to promote his father's reno-

Scramble for Black Votes

They could swing the election

The candidate for President stood last week in a rubble-strewn lot in one of New York City's worst ghettos. Behind him, on the wall of a rundown tenement, was a one-word message of despair in orange paint: DECAY. On another nearby building was a scrawled reminder of what the neighborhood had received from white politicians in the past: BROKEN PROMISES. The candidate read a brief statement to reporters. Said he: "I'm impressed with the spirit of hope and determination by the people to save what they have." Hecklers in a crowd of 70 young black and Hispanic onlookers shouted: "Do something for us! Help us! Speak to the people, not the press!" But as he tried to speak to the crowd, he was drowned out by obscenities and chants. The candidate grew angry. "What I'm trying to tell you," he shouted above the din, "is I can't do a damn thing for you if I'm not elected."

The candidate in the angry confrontation happened to be Republican Ronald Reagan. But much of the bitterness directed at him, particularly by the blacks, could have as easily been aimed at Democrat Jimmy Carter or Independent John Anderson or even, in some areas, Senator Edward Kennedy.

Black voters, who make up 11% of the U.S. electorate, feel increasingly left out of the American economic system and political process. Since 1964, when a record 59% of black voters went to the polls, the turnout has steadily shrunk; in 1976, it was only 49%. "It is informed apathy," says Columbus Keepler, field services director for the Atlanta-based Voter Education Project, which was in the forefront of the Southern voter registration drives of the 1960s. "Many people voted once or twice and didn't see anything happen, so they don't vote any more." But as Carter showed in 1976, even a small black turnout can be important. He drew 90% of the 6.6 million black votes cast, which helped tip several key Southern and Northern industrial states into his column, including Ohio, Pennsylvania and Texas.

However small and skeptical, the black vote also could be a key factor in the coming election, and it was the object of ardent wooing last week by all four candidates. The courtship occurred most directly in the regal grand ballroom of the New York Hilton, site of the annual convention of the National Urban League, which for 70 years has helped blacks to get jobs, housing and education.

In three days of speeches, none of the politicians made any new promises or said much that had not been heard before by the generally reserved audience of 16,000, most of whom were middle-aged and middle class. Anderson was regard-

Nicaragua Issue

- Do you want to raise with Muskie this issue:
our assessment, State's view of aid, etc.?

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

Handwritten signature and initials

28 August 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

1. Last week David called me and asked for a paper setting forth our assessment of the extent to which Nicaragua is involved in exporting revolution. The attached paper gives our best judgment on the extent to which Nicaragua is aiding the Salvadoran revolutionaries. [REDACTED]

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2. As this is a subject of some concern, especially with regard to the pending aid legislation for Nicaragua, perhaps it would be advisable to have an SCC/PRC meeting in order to air all views. [REDACTED]

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/s/

STANSFIELD TURNER

Attachment

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED


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Central America



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
National Foreign Assessment Center

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30 August 1980

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Soviet Options for Military Intervention in Poland

1. A Soviet decision to invade Poland would be predicated on both:

--the existence of political conditions requiring the use of military force to control the situation; and

--a Soviet perception that the Polish government and military were either unwilling or unable to take effective action.

Specific examples of situations which could prompt such a decision might include a refusal by portions of the Polish armed forces to take actions ordered by the Polish government or fundamental changes in the Polish political system which were unacceptable to the Soviets. [REDACTED]

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2. We doubt that the Soviets would attempt a small-scale military intervention in Poland. The use of small contingents of Soviet troops to supplement the efforts of the Polish military probably would be undesirable from the point of view of both the Soviet and Polish governments. The Soviets' restrained behavior to date indicates that they strongly prefer that the Polish government use its own military units to deal with any situation requiring military force. Moreover, we doubt that the Polish government would request the assistance of Soviet troops even under considerable pressure. If such a request were made, however, the two Soviet divisions already in Poland as part

NOTE: This memorandum was prepared by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Office of Strategic Research. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to [REDACTED]

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of the Soviet Northern Group of Forces might be used (See Map 1 - Soviet Ground Force Divisions In and Around Poland). [REDACTED]

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3. A more likely eventuality is that prior to or concurrent with Soviet preparations for a large-scale military invasion triggered by unacceptable Polish events, the Soviets would begin to "intervene" politically using the threat of military force. They probably would issue warnings of some kind in their press and radio broadcasts, send high-level emissaries to Warsaw or call Polish officials to Moscow, and take a variety of other steps designed to show the Poles that Soviet tolerance was over.

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4. Given the general anti-Russian attitude of the Polish populace, we assume that at least some Polish military forces would resist a Soviet invasion. In any event, Soviet planners would assume that their invasion force would not only have to subdue substantial civil disturbances but would also have to contend with active resistance from part or all of the Polish military. The Soviets in 1968 evidently assumed that the Czechoslovak military would resist and concentrated 29 divisions for about a 3:1 force superiority against them. We also know that the Soviets rate the military capability of the Polish armed forces highly--second only to the East Germans among the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact allies--and would expect the Polish military to fight effectively should they decide to do so. [REDACTED]

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5. The Soviets would want to prepare a force large enough to subdue resistance quickly and, indeed, to discourage resistance by its overwhelming appearance. (See Maps 1 and 2 - Soviet Ground Force Divisions In and Around Poland). The actual invasion force might consist of the majority of their divisions in the three western military districts, along with the two Soviet divisions already in Poland and possibly five Soviet divisions from East Germany. Two airborne divisions and other specialized units might be added to this force and at least token non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) participation would be sought (see paragraph 8). The invasion force might total about 500,000 men including more than 30 divisions (see Troop List - Soviet Ground Force Divisions In and Around Poland). Over 250,000 men would have to be mobilized to form this invasion force and its immediate support elements. At least some of the 14 Soviet divisions remaining in East Germany probably

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would be prepared to reinforce the effort if necessary. Moreover, we believe the Soviets would mobilize additional forces in the western USSR in order to be prepared for all contingencies. [REDACTED]

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6. On balance, we believe that the Soviets would need about two weeks to mobilize such a force and adequately prepare it for the demanding job of decisively and promptly subduing Polish resistance once the invasion began. The Soviets likely would perceive several difficulties in making units available for the invasion and in preparing them for the invasion. The most ready divisions that could be used to invade Poland are those in the Soviet groups of forces in Eastern Europe--particularly the 19 Soviet divisions in East Germany (see Map 2 - Soviet Ground Force Divisions In and Around Poland - By Category). Undoubtedly they would use the two Soviet divisions already in Poland. We believe, however, that they would be hesitant to use more than about five of the Soviet divisions in East Germany both because of concern that political unrest might spread to East Germany and because of concern regarding possible NATO actions during the period of civil disturbance in Eastern Europe. Only five Soviet divisions from East Germany participated in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and then only after the Soviets had reinforced their troops in East Germany with recently mobilized divisions from the USSR. [REDACTED]

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7. Even though the 30 divisions the Soviets would probably want to use for such an invasion could be mobilized and moved into position in about a week, commanders, staffs, and the troops themselves would not have been exercised or rehearsed in the type of actions they would likely be engaged in or in the specific plans for the invasion. Because of the Soviets' desire to ensure a prompt and decisive outcome--and perhaps, through intimidation, to avoid the necessity for an actual invasion--they probably would take at least a week following the one week of mobilization to exercise the invasion force and to demonstrate its strength to the Poles. If negotiations were proceeding and the Soviets judged that more time could be spared, preparations might extend over weeks or months. In the case of a two-week preparation time we would expect to detect mobilization on this scale within one to two days of its initiation. Political events in Poland and elsewhere would also help to provide us warning. [REDACTED]

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8. At least token NSWP participation would probably be sought to lend legitimacy to the intervention. If the

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decision to invade were made within the next several days, some NSWP forces assembled for exercise Comrades-in-Arms might be retained in the vicinity of Poland after the scheduled end of the field activities which are to run from 8 to 12 September. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The non-Polish forces currently scheduled for participation in the exercise, however, are too small to constitute a suitable invasion force. Thus, we do not believe that an invasion would be launched following Comrades-in-Arms without further mobilization. [REDACTED]

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9. If the situation in Poland were deteriorating rapidly and the Soviets judged that they must intervene hastily, despite the high military and political risks involved, they could commit a portion of their mobilizing force more rapidly. The airborne divisions, some of the higher strength divisions from the USSR immediately adjacent to Poland, and possibly some Soviet divisions in East Germany and in Poland would likely be used (see Troop List). Sixteen divisions probably could be assembled and committed within four days under exigent circumstances. The urgency of political events and the intensity of military operations would likely give us warning within the first day of all-out preparations. Such a hastily prepared invasion would not provide the overwhelming show of force during its early stages that the Soviets probably would like to have to discourage resistance. It would also be poorly rehearsed if undertaken without prior command post exercises and there might be insufficient time for securing NSWP participation. The Soviets might calculate, however, that reinforcements could be brought in from East Germany--despite the risk of seriously weakening their military posture there--if the initial invasion force could not quickly subdue Poland. [REDACTED]

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10. Polish forces are disposed to defend against a NATO attack from the west (see Maps 3 and 4 - Polish Ground Force Divisions). The Warsaw Military District (MD) forces in the east are both fewer and less ready than Pomeranian and Silesian MD forces in the west. These forces would be no match for Soviet units from the western USSR. Soviet units invading from East Germany, however, could meet stiffer resistance. Key Polish airfields would be possible targets for early seizure by Soviet airborne forces while Polish air defense assets would have to be considered by Soviet planners (see Map 5 - Polish Airfields and Air Defense Sites). Because of the short air distances involved, the Poles probably would have little tactical warning. [REDACTED]

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11. We believe there would be observable differences between a Soviet mobilization in preparation for an invasion of Poland and the type of mobilization that the Pact would undertake in preparation for war with NATO. Mobilization probably would be restricted to the western USSR and, even there, would not be total. Mobilization likely would be very limited within the NSWP countries. Soviet strategic and naval forces might not significantly change their readiness posture. [REDACTED]

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Soviet Ground Force Divisions In and Around Poland—By Type

Map 1




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
Polish Ground Force Divisions—By Type

Map 3




Polish Ground Force Divisions-By Category

Map 4



Polish Airfields and Air Defense Sites

Map 5



Categorization of Divisions

- Category I : These divisions are estimated to have a full complement of combat equipment and more than three-fourths of their authorized wartime personnel.
- Category II : These divisions also have a full complement of combat equipment, but frequently lack some support equipment. Assigned personnel strengths vary from about one-third of authorized wartime strength in some NSWP divisions to about two-thirds in Soviet divisions.
- Category III : These divisions are manned at cadre strength with manpower levels ranging from about one-tenth to one-third of authorized wartime personnel. They apparently have most of their essential combat equipment, except armored personnel carriers, but have less support equipment than Category II divisions.

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OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS

Bulletin

Item #1

2 September 1980

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FAM-LABOR-URGENT

(CHANGING DATELINE)

BY COLIN McINTYRE

JASTRZEBIE, POLAND, SEPT 2, REUTER - MORE THAN 200,000

WORKERS WENT ON STRIKE IN POLAND'S INDUSTRIAL HEARTLAND TODAY AS INDUSTRIAL TURMOIL SPREAD TO THE COAL MINES; STRIKE LEADERS REPORTED.

STRIKE LEADERS AT THEIR HEADQUARTERS IN THIS UPPER SILESIAN COAL MINING TOWN, CLOSE TO THE CZECHOSLOVAK BORDER, SAID 32 ENTERPRISES INCLUDING 19 COAL MINES, HAD JOINED THEIR MOVEMENT.

THE OFFICIAL INTERPRESS NEWS AGENCY REPORTED STRIKES AT 18 COAL MINES.

THE STRIKERS WERE DEMANDING THE SAME RIGHTS TO FORM THEIR OWN TRADE UNIONS GRANTED ON SUNDAY TO BALTIC COAST WORKERS.

THEY SAID THEY WERE DUE TO MEET A GOVERNMENT NEGOTIATING TEAM LATER TODAY AND WERE OPTIMISTIC THAT THEY WOULD SIGN AN ACCORD.

FAM-LABOR 2 JASTRZEBIE

THE SPREAD OF THE STRIKE WAVE TO SILESIA, THE POWER BASE OF PARTY LEADER EDWARD GIEREK, ADDED A MORRISOME NEW ELEMENT TO THE LABOR AND POLITICAL CRISIS THAT HAS ROCKED POLAND SINCE JULY 1.

THE SILESIAN STRIKERS HAVE SET UP AN INTERFACTORY COMMITTEE, MODELLED ON THE ONE IN THE LENIN SHIPYARD IN GDANSK WHICH SPEARHEADED THE BALTIC WORKERS' REVOLT AND wrested FROM THE AUTHORITIES THE FIRST-EVER GUARANTEES IN THE SOVIET BLOC OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE AND FORM INDEPENDENT TRADE UNIONS. THE HEADQUARTERS HERE ARE AT THE LIPCONY COAL MINE, SOME 30 MILES FROM KATOWICE.

OPA Comment: We do not believe that this will pose a major problem for the Polish government. A quick settlement is likely with smaller, local issues still to be solved.